The Effect of ECJ Judgements and the 'Citizenship Turn' of the EU Social Policy
We can find the elements of individualism and individualisation in EU social policy. Below, we will substantiate this argument with several examples. The role of the ECJ is instrumental in this regard, as individual 'rights' protection is suited to transnational adjudication, especially after union citizenship acquired the status of quasi-fundamental rights.
(1) Centrality of the 'Four Freedoms'
Unlike the political processes of Member States, the EU policy process is characterised by the autonomy of each policy domain. This is due to the stepby-step integration process and patchwork distribution of competence between the EU and Member States (cf. 'Five Policy Modes', Wallace 2010). Further, executive coordination, such as by a party government or president, is lacking.
Still, without a doubt the construction of the common market has been the central policy concern throughout the integration process. In this area, the EU's competence is comparatively wide, and its rule-enforcing power is strong. In particular, the realisation of the 'four freedoms'-the free movement of goods, capital, services and people-is powerful leverage against Member States.
These four freedoms were instrumental in the expansion of ECJ influence. The supremacy and the direct effect of EC law were made possible by these freedoms as the telos of integration. EU law must be prioritised because imported goods and services can be directly or indirectly disadvantaged without uniform interpretation of EU-wide rules.
In contrast, social policy may be the least integrated policy domain besides foreign policy. The Amsterdam Treaty is the most recent, major expansion of the EU competence. After the Nice revision, Article 3 of the treaty listing community activities only indirectly touches on social policy. In Chapter 11 on 'Social Policy', Article 137 stipulates community competence but with strict reservations, saying that the 'provisions adopted pursuant to this article shall not affect the right of Member
States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof'. Further, pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lockouts are explicitly excluded from community competence.
In short, the core of the Member States' social security system is the least integrated policy area. This is because the economic disparities between the Member
States are directly reflected in this policy area and the historically accumulated 'welfare regimes' are hard to integrate due to their differences in ordering principles and methods.
(2) Union Citizenship and the Role of the ECJ
EU-level social policy initiatives are more prominent regarding problems related to the free movement of person and anti-discrimination. As the former is closely connected with the four freedoms, EU legislation on this topic began in 1958. The latter came to the fore in the 1990s. In both policy areas, the role of the ECJ has been decisive.
When the union citizenship clause was introduced into the Maastricht
Treaty, few expected that it would bring about far-reaching change. From this development, we can clearly see a typical pattern of judicialisation:
once the judiciary is active in a specific policy domain, societal actors begin to use judicial avenues as an effective bypass of the stagnant political route to realise their own agendas. Throughout this process, argumentation, strategy and the objective of the societal actor will also transform to a certain degree. We contend that this kind of clash is due to the logical difference between EU social policy and Member States' existing systems of social and employment policy.
In other words, the clash is not just between the 'liberal' EU and 'social' Member States, but also between different conceptions of the 'social'. As suggested above, EU social policy has a tendency to grant a right to minimum social protection to every individual. In that sense, it has the characteristic of social 'citizenship' regardless of nationality (cf. Member State may find a specific type of social order to be 'their own' order and make due consideration to it even in relation to an individual's fundamental rights. Among the growing diversity of social systems and norms, the ECJ cannot afford this type of consideration. As the task of the ECJ is to determine a common framework for all Member States, it cannot rely on a specific understanding of public order. In this regard, individuals' fundamental rights are useful and powerful instruments. They are common to Member States and can be used against ordinary (Member State) laws because fundamental rights are supposed to be superior (Höpner 2008 ). In the next section, we will sketch concrete examples of this kind of clash.
Clash of Individualised Policy and Collectivist Order: Examples of the ECJ Judgements (1) Four ECJ Judgements in Focus
In this subsection, we analyse four recent ECJ judgements (Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg) and the political reactions to them. These judgements have been perceived as a severe blow to existing Member States' social systems and invited criticism from different angles. Through an analysis of the judgements and the reactions to them, we try to illuminate the importance of the clash between individualistic social policy and collective order.
The background of the conflict is the Posting of Workers Directive (Directive 96/71/EC). As a matter of principle, the free movement of persons and services makes it possible for a company to send workers to other EU countries under working conditions that fulfil only the minimum standards of the sending country, not those of the receiving country. As an exemption from this principle, this directive stipulates that the receiving country 'shall ensure that ... the undertakings referred to in Article 1(1) guarantee workers posted to their territory the terms and conditions of employment ... in the Member State where the work is carried out', as far as core aspects such as maximum work periods, minimum rates of pay or provisions on non-discrimination. The minimum conditions shall be laid down 'by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable within the meaning of paragraph 8'.
As can be imagined, which Member State rules fall within 'the terms and conditions of employment' of this directive has been a source of conflict.
In Land government of Niedersachsen made the application for collective agreement mandatory to the company accepting a public construction order. As the company did not apply this to its Polish subcontractor, the Niedersachsen sued the company.
Referred by the German court, the ECJ determined that securing minimum working conditions through public contract was not an acceptable means defined by the directive and was therefore illegal. and that only the minimum conditions had to be clearly defined.
Through these four cases, the limits of defensive actions by labour or the government against service provision by low-paid workers has been more precisely defined. The ECJ recognised trade union's fundamental right to strike and accepted governments' justifications of restrictions on the risk of social dumping, at least as a matter of principle. Nevertheless, the legality of all the protective measures were denied because the minimum standard had to be literally minimum and clearly defined by law or a declaration of universal applicability, according to the ECJ. The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions shall be guaranteed to every individual and to every occupation or profession. Agreements that restrict or seek to impair this right shall be null and void; measures directed to this end shall be unlawful. Measures taken pursuant to Article 12a, to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 35, to paragraph (4) of Article 87a, or to Article 91 may not be directed against industrial disputes engaged in by associations within the meaning of the first sentence of this paragraph in order to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions.
The Federal Constitutional Court has interpreted this text to mean that the state delegates a core domain of the collective agreement system to social partners (Löwisch 1989) . In its seminal judgement, the Federal Constitutional Court stated, 'The purpose of the collective agreements is to give an order to working life ' (BVerfG vom 18.11.1954. BVerfGE 4, 96ff, hier 108 ).
This was not only a reaction to the state regulation of industrial relations in the Nazi period, but also an expression of critical reflection on the Weimar experience when autonomous conflict resolution did not function smoothly and governments were often forced to resort to compulsory arbitration (cf. Nautz 1985). Due to this historical background, (West) German industrial relations are characterised by the rare use of governmental instruments such as wage freezes. The declaration of general applicability, which may be invoked as substitute for governmental regulation, has been issued only sporadically. In short, the norm of governmental restraint in the regulation of industrial relations and autonomous rulemaking by social partners was established and firmly took root as a kind of constitution in a material sense.
As the ECJ judgements were seen as a frontal assault on this quasi-constitutional norm, it is no wonder that the German public reacted with such sensitivity. In addition, as far as the Rüffert judgement was concerned, a similar law in Berlin was already sanctioned by the Federal Constitutional Court, which added further fuel to the fire.
(4) The Real Stake of the Conflict
Roger Liddle, a former advisor to Tony Blair, said that Scharpf's 'warning that the European project represents a judicial entrenchment of neo-liberalism needs to be treated with the utmost seriousness' (Liddle 2008, 27) . Although Scharpf's argument was more nuanced, the 'ECJ equals neo-liberalism' thesis can be seen elsewhere, and Scharpf himself talked of 'judicial deregulation' in a later article (Scharpf 2010) .
Has the ECJ become neo-liberal? Theoretically, it is plausible to infer neo- We need to say a clear 'no' to any kind of social dumping and a clear 'no' to attempts to create 'letterbox companies' intended to avoid minimum standards for pay and working conditions. Social principles must not be subordinated to economic freedoms.
On the other hand, a socialist MEP from Estonia supported the judgement, writing:
Unfortunately, the desire of several Western European trade union organisations to close markets to the new Member States once again will not help unite
Europe.
This contrast surely lends plausibility to the 'liberalisation by enlargement'
hypothesis. However, from our perspective, the four judgements can be interpreted in line with previous judgements, especially those expanding social rights. In
Viking, the court stated that 'it is for the national court to determine whether the jobs or conditions of employment of that trade union's members who are liable to be affected by the re-flagging of the Rosella were jeopardised or under serious threat'
(paragraph 83, emphasis added). This means that what can be protected against the four freedoms is the specific interest of individual workers (Kocher 2008) . This corresponds to a series of anti-discrimination decisions that protected individuals' social rights.
In Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg, the issue is almost the same: 'What constitutes an enforceable minimum standard?' In Laval, the Swedish tradition of autonomous regulation of social partners was denied. In Rüffert, an indirect method of government procurement fell outside justifiable minimum. In Luxembourg, too, the blanket recognition of universally applicable collective agreements in Luxembourgian Law was found incompatible with the directive (paragraphs 62-69).
All these indicate that the minimum standard must be transparent and therefore defined by a statutory law or universally applicable collective agreements with specific content. It is not about the substance of the minimum standard but the way the norm was established.
Then, what is the source of the controversy? From our viewpoint, it is the individual-rights orientation and relative disregard for the collective-order aspects of those judgements. In the above-mentioned symposium convened by the German government, the representative of the Swedish Trade Union expressed his concern as follows, which illuminates our point:
[T]he ECJ did much more than necessary in the Laval case. The criticisms made by Blanke (2008) resonate with this statement. One of his points is that the recognition of the right to strike by the ECJ is limited to the purpose of protecting the workers. In his view, trade unions should be given a larger role than that.
In contrast, the ECJ prioritises individual rights protection and sees the state as the standard setter. In the words of Loïc Azoulai, who spent three years in the ECJ as Référendaire in the Cabinet of General Advocate Poiares Maduro:
What is at issue, in the eyes of the court is not so much the substance of social obligations ...; it is the way these obligations are fixed.... The State alone is habilitated to define the social model applicable to all businesses on its territory.
This condemns autonomous collective actions undertaken to the same end. It may be said that the FCC has been using the carrot-and-stick strategy with the ECJ. Still, the fact remains that the FCC has offered ground for compromise and encouraged the ECJ to recalibrate social and labour issues.
Then, will the ECJ make concessions by limiting the scope of its controversial judgements? Although any answer would be speculative at the moment, the ECJ might respond with comity 4 . In Lufthansa v. Kumpan (C-109/09), an agediscrimination case, the ECJ based the ruling on Mangold but refrained from precluding relevant German law, leaving discretion on substantial points to the national court with request for an EU-law conforming interpretation. Also in Rosenbladt (C-45/09), the ECJ did not preclude the German law that allows automatic termination of employment contracts under several conditions. Nevertheless, our perspective illuminates one important issue for future developments: It is the 'Tarifautonomie' problematique. The word had never been To summarise, the distance between the German FCC and the ECJ on social issues is not as great as has been emphasised in political discussions. One of the remaining issues is the 'collective order' dimension of social rights, most clearly exemplified in the Tarifautonomie problematique. The German courts are clearly aware of this point and send the relevant cases to the ECJ, where a few judges serve as their 'allies' for advancing this point. At the moment, the ECJ continues to disregard it altogether, which may indicate the relevance of our perspective.
Summary of the Argument and Implication
Let us summarise our arguments. First, EU social policy has a specific characteristic. It aims at universal protection of social minimum regardless of nationality, sex or race. For this purpose, union citizenship has been quite instrumental.
Second, in advancing this agenda, 'creative' ECJ judgements have played an important role. As a result of this judicial intervention, the emphasis on individual 'rights' has been strengthened. This is due to the nature of the ECJ as judicial and supranational body.
Third, the real conflict in recent ECJ judgements is not 'liberal versus social' or 'integration versus autonomy'. The conflict is between two different aspects of social and employment policy: individual rights protection and collective public order. We have tried to demonstrate the relevance of this perspective through an analysis of four ECJ judgements and the subsequent political and judicial reactions. In particular, the Tarifautonomie problematique is a unique finding from this perspective.
As an extension of this argument, we may speculate that self-defeating logic is inherent in EU social policy. The more the EU tries to enhance the social aspects of integration with the help of the ECJ, the further the individualisation of social policy proceeds and the less stable the collective rule-making system becomes 
